Indian Strategic Studies

6 April 2025

Adani’s Controversial Footprint in India’s Neighborhood (and Elsewhere)

Paranjoy Guha Thakurta

Few had heard of him two decades ago. Today, at 62, Gautam Adani – a college drop-out who is very close to India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi – is one of the world’s richest people. Adani’s corporate conglomerate straddles energy, transportation, cement, defense equipment, edible oils, food distribution, and much else, in the country and across the world.

The market capitalization of the Adani Group, comprising a dozen-odd companies whose shares are listed on stock exchanges, is over $200 billion. (Market capitalization is the face value of a company’s share multiplied by its price at a given point in time.) In addition, Adani, his family members, and associates directly or indirectly control at least 1,000 entities, many of which are based out of tax havens where little or no tax is paid on company profits.

In a manner of speaking, what Elon Musk is to U.S. President Donald Trump, Adani is to Modi, but with an important difference: Adani does not hold any position in the government of India. Yet New Delhi has shaped policies, tweaked rules, bent norms, and looked the other way when investigations into Adani’s affairs have taken place – the most egregious of which is an indictment for bribery and concealment of information in the United States.

We tried ‘fighting China’ with lower budgets. It didn’t go well.

TRAVIS SHARP, CASEY NICASTRO and EVAN BRADEN MONTGOMERY

By month’s end, Congressional leaders expect the Trump administration to release a “skinny budget” containing topline spending amounts for the Defense Department. Though specifics will come later, the choices that shape this fiscal 2026 skinny budget will set policy direction for the next four years.

This first budget submission will surely reflect the administration’s interim strategic guidance, which reportedly downgrades Europe relative to Asia. It will also showcase the administration’s ongoing push to shrink the Defense Department civilian workforce. Most importantly, it will reflect the results of the 8-percent spending shift directed by Secretary Hegseth. In February, he tasked defense organizations to prepare lists of lower-priority activities totaling 8 percent of their 2026–2030 projected budgets—some $365 billion over five years that may be reallocated elsewhere. He also identified 17 high-priority areas that were to be protected from funding reductions.

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments got some early insight into the hard choices involved with the skinny budget and spending relook. Back in January, we conducted an exercise to assess how to adjust defense spending to meet the China challenge. Participants joined from across the U.S. government, defense industry, and think tank community. They wrestled with what to fund based on different strategies for stopping a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and different trajectories for defense budgets.

The Chinese Military’s Challenges in the 2030s

Toshi Yoshihara, and Casey Nicastro

Rarely does a week go by without more grim news about China’s growing military power and the deteriorating strategic balance in Asia. Projections of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into the 2030s, assuming deterrence holds between now and then, suggest that the operational environment will be even more hostile to the U.S. armed forces and those of its Asian allies. Although unpleasant circumstances a decade from now may seem a distant prospect, force planning decisions must be made now for them to bear fruit in time for that dangerous future. To do so, policymakers must come to grips with difficult choices and trade-offs about force structure and posture that are cost conscious and tactically relevant amidst uncertainty.

To wrestle with these choices and trade-offs, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) ran a series of force-rebalancing exercises in Washington and Canberra to forecast what the correlation of forces might look like a decade hence. Exercise participants used a one-of-a-kind web-based tool to rebalance the PLA and the Australian Defence Force in an interactive simulation. The goal was to test how local powers—by themselves and alongside the United States—might best prepare for and respond to the Chinese military’s most acute challenges in the mid-2030s.

Will Moscow Help Washington “Solve” the Iranian Problem?

Nikita Smagin

The rapprochement between Moscow and Washington that began after Donald Trump’s inauguration as president of the United States has sparked hopes not only of an end to the war in Ukraine, but also that it could shape the outcome of long-running diplomatic issues. Iran has been watching developments with particular unease, worrying that it could become a bargaining chip in the diplomatic back-and-forth between Moscow and Washington.

The recent telephone conversation between Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin only added to Tehran’s misgivings. Most concerning for Tehran was the White House’s statement that Putin and Trump “shared the view that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel.” Given that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program seems closer than ever, this could be read as Moscow’s willingness to sacrifice Tehran for the greater goal of restoring ties with Washington. But is there any truth to this?

There’s nothing new in suspicions between Russia and Iran: indeed, wariness of Moscow’s intentions has long been widespread among both the Iranian elite and broader society. The reasons are myriad: they include the military interventions by the Russian Empire and Soviet Union in Iran and, more recently, Moscow’s refusal to vote against United Nations resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program. So there’s nothing particularly surprising about Iranian fears that Moscow will try to sell them out.

Here are Some of the Weapons Israel Could Use in Its Iran Airstrike

Brandon J. Weichert

With the rumors about the potential Israeli airstrikes against suspected Iranian nuclear weapons development facilities running rampant, it is important to understand what kinds of weapons the Israeli Air Force (IAF) would use—and what the possible targets are.

It’s also important to understand that the kind of weapons that Israel might use in these rumored pending airstrikes against Iran depend upon the nature of the targets in Iran, their locations, and the strategic goals of the operation.

Based on Israel’s military capabilities, past actions, and the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, several types of weapons could be considered. Iran’s nuclear sites, notably Natanz and Fordow, are known to include fortified underground facilities, necessarily complicating any attack and narrowing the range of effective options.

What Systems Does Israel Have?

The IAF’s primary warplane is the F-15I Ra’am.

Of course, its most advanced warplane is the Lockheed Martin-built F-35I Adir, which was already used with decisive effect in October 2024, when the IAF destroyed several Russian-built S-300 air defense systems around Tehran. Israel has since claimed that they possess “escalation dominance” after the destruction of those S-300 systems.

The Narrow Path to a New Middle East

Dana Stroul

The Iranian regime is on its back foot, more vulnerable internally and exposed abroad than at any point since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Before Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and Israel’s subsequent multipronged war on Iranian interests, Iran’s huge investments in its missile arsenal, its nuclear weapons program, and its network of regional proxy actors had sharply constrained the United States’ strategy toward the Middle East. Washington’s Iran-focused policy analysts remained divided on just what mix of tools would effectively deter Iranian aggression, but they generally agreed that if Tehran were pushed too hard, it would retain a menu of retaliatory options that risked full-scale war. Four successive U.S. presidents—George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump in his first term, and Joe Biden—all settled on using diplomacy and sanctions for deterrence and never authorized military strikes inside Iranian territory.

Israel’s operational successes have shattered those preconceptions—and opened a window of opportunity to finish dismantling Iran’s regional threat network and build a safer and more stable Middle East. Key leaders throughout Iran’s so-called axis of resistance have been killed, and tens of thousands of Iranian-backed fighters have been taken off the battlefield. Axis arsenals have been devastated, and Israel has degraded the Iranian military-industrial complex that once replenished them. When Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled Damascus in December, Tehran’s leaders lost a crucial ally who had helped them turn Syria into the transit hub they used to resupply its proxy militias with weapons, funds, and fighters. Its two ballistic missile attacks on Israel in 2024 were a failure that further degraded its deterrence as well as its affiliate groups’ morale, calling Tehran’s value as a patron into question.

Is the U.S. Army Ready for World War III?

James Jay Carafano

Is America’s Army Ready for World War III?: Is America ready for World War III? Ready for what?

They’re asking and answering that question in the Pentagon now.

Addressing that issue is more difficult for American ground forces than for any other service. To make the task of preparing for the future easier, policymakers and planners can always say, “We won’t do that” to wish away the challenges they don’t want to address—but the enemy always gets a vote—and their vote counts.

Why America’s Army Won’t Face World War III Alone

Inevitably, land power winds up being the Swiss Army Knife of military capabilities. No matter what war is planned for the US Army (and its sister service, the Marine Corps), boots on the ground wind up getting thrown into a myriad of missions from border security to counterterrorism, homeland defense, post-conflict security, and more, that are dictated by circumstances rather than force planners.

Predicting the adequacy of the US Army for future missions requires assessing both capacity and versatility. After four years of the Trump presidency, American ground forces will likely be better prepared to defend and safeguard American interests. Here is why.

Navy expands use of AI for target spotting, tracking

LAUREN C. WILLIAMS

Next year, two U.S. warships are slated to get a prototype AI-powered system designed to filter their sensor data for potential targets—and then predict their behavior, according to the system’s manufacturer.

“The sensors that the Navy operates are so sophisticated and sensitive [they] can pick up very small things, but they need to be able to tell, ‘Is that a small thing that we should care about or is that a small thing that is just irrelevant’?” said Ben FitzGerald, CEO for Rebellion Defense.

Last year, the Navy’s Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems X—the outfit responsible for upgrading combat platforms—awarded Rebellion Defense a contract to continue developing its Iris target-processing software. Awarded via other transaction authority, the contract covered two prototype phases and a production phase.

Now, the Navy is extending Rebellion’s contract for an undisclosed amount and another 14 months, aiming to put Iris on two ships and ensure that it “works in a way that the Navy is comfortable with on Navy platforms and systems,” FitzGerald said. “We'll be doing integration work through the IWS software pipeline, and then we'll be able to do testing on ships in 2026.”

US Military Build-Up on Diego Garcia: Show of Force or Prelude to Conflict with Iran?

Geopolitical Scenario

The military presence can be seen as a calculated attempt to leverage power dynamics, extending the option of negotiations while maintaining a credible threat. However, the risk of an actual conflict remains high due to Iran’s perception of an imminent threat and the broader geopolitical context. The presence of B-2 bombers in Diego Garcia (at least six – 30% of the US Air Force’s stealth bomber fleet), previously used in major Middle East operations, suggests that military action is being seriously considered, even if it remains a last resort.

From Iran’s perspective, Trump’s threats lack credibility given his historical pattern of aggressive rhetoric, followed by diplomatic overtures. However, the Islamic Republic cannot afford to ignore the possibility of a strike, prompting discussions within Tehran’s high command about pre-emptive actions. If Iran believes an attack is imminent, it may strike first, leading to a rapid escalation.

In past confrontations, particularly during tensions with Israel, Iran has threatened to target regional oil fields if US-aligned Gulf nations were to support an attack against it. A similar scenario could unfold again, with the potential to not only push Gulf countries into a mediating role but also disrupt oil supplies from the Gulf—an outcome that would heavily impact European nations reliant on energy imports from the region. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have consequently imposed a ban on US warplanes using their air fields or skies to attack Iran.

Is the U.S. Heading Into a Recession Amid Trump’s Tariffs? ‘Liberation Day’ Fallout Sparks Fresh Fears

Rebecca Schneid

On April 2, President Donald Trump held his long-promised “Liberation Day,” during which he took to the Rose Garden of the White House and announced a vast swath of tariffs that he will be implementing.

Trump’s “Liberation Day” moves saw the introduction of a 10% tariff on all imported goods, and additional import taxes—of varying degrees—placed on 60 other countries.

The U.S. and global markets have already started to feel the impact of Trump’s tariffs, with the U.S. stock market taking the worst hit thus far. At the end of Thursday, April 3, Dow Jones closed at 1,700 points lower. Plus, the S&P 500 and Nasdaq indexes had their worst day since 2020. Thursday also ended with the U.S. dollar dipping to a six-month low against the EURO, falling along with U.S. bond yields.

On Friday, April 4, morning reports showed that as of 10:30 a.m. ET, the S&P 500 index was down 193 points (3.58%).

Can Europe Build Its Own Nuclear Umbrella?

Sophia Besch and Anna Bartoux

Why the surge of interest in a European nuclear force?

The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, after only a few weeks in office, has raised serious doubts among its European allies about America’s commitment to their security and the NATO alliance. Recent leaks confirm the antagonism leading members of the administration feel toward Europe. This has led Europeans to seriously worry about whether Washington will continue to extend nuclear deterrence—sometimes referred to as a nuclear “umbrella”—to the continent. Some leaders have begun to discuss their nuclear options.

Allied doubts about U.S. extended deterrence commitments are an inherent feature of the relationship, not just a Trump effect. In the 1950s, the belief that a U.S. president would never sacrifice “New York for Paris” became a justification for France’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability independent of the United States. What’s more, selective releases of intelligence throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine indicate that, despite its threats, Moscow has not yet taken any concrete actions to increase the risks of nuclear war. It has not, for instance, moved nuclear weapons out of storage or raised the alert level of its nuclear forces, contrary to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims. Consequently, not all Europeans agree that there is a greater need than in the past to bolster European nuclear options to deter Russian threats.

Why Are Political Protests Surging Around the World?

Thomas Carothers and Judy Lee

Sizable anti-government protests with a pointed political edge are mushrooming in multiple regions. A knot of protests has hit the Balkans—in Bosnia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Another set has erupted in Central and Eastern Europe, including in Georgia, Hungary, and Slovakia. Demonstrations have also flared in Greece, Israel, Mozambique, South Korea, and Türkiye. What is triggering this surge in political protests? And does it represent good or bad news for democracy globally?

Governments’ anti-democratic actions are driving most of these protests. In two cases, Georgia and Mozambique, the widely perceived manipulation of national elections pushed citizens into the streets. In Georgia, the new government’s decision to suspend accession talks with the EU added fuel to the fire. In both countries, protests have continued for several months.

The Problems With European Security Guarantees for Ukraine

Rym Momtaz

A core group of European leaders has stepped up in recent weeks to ensure the continent’s security isn’t steamrolled in a United States-Russia settlement in Ukraine.

The flurry of meetings of this so-called “coalition of the willing” has defined a three-pronged approach to Ukraine: supercharging the Ukrainian military’s ability to defend against Russian aggression, reaching a ceasefire with a verification mechanism, and deterring any additional or future Russian attacks.

This European strategy for Ukraine has been the result of UK-French leadership. And the talks have stood out because of their speed and intensity as well as their unprecedented format—discussing European security without the United States coordinating.

But, at this stage, the numbers don’t add up and statements by leaders have dangerously raised expectations, setting themselves up for failure. As currently defined, each of the three objectives laid out by Europeans for bolstering their and Ukraine’s security remain out of reach.

The Europeans can’t impose a ceasefire in Ukraine, but have made it a prerequisite for their deterrent in-country deployment. Even leaders as influential with U.S. President Donald Trump as French President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, or Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni are struggling to shape negotiations over Ukraine and don’t have a clear understanding of Trump’s dealbreakers.

Securing the Digital and Orbital Frontiers in Ukraine

Benjamin Jensen and Erica Lonergan

Within hours of the announcement of a ceasefire in Ukraine that limited conventional attacks on critical infrastructure and military operations in the Black Sea, something interesting happened: a dueling series of cyberattacks. Ukrainian railways were hit by a large-scale cyberattack designed to limit both military and economic transportation (though the attack did not actually disrupt any railway traffic). In Russia, cyberattacks hit a mix of banking apps, mobile payment systems, internet providers, and the oil giant Lukoil.

These tit-for-tat cyber operations highlight a new pattern: how states are increasingly using non-kinetic attacks against critical infrastructure as a coercive strategy to gain a competitive advantage and manage escalation, even during a war. Covert or anonymous strikes in cyberspace—and even in space—are becoming an important form of bargaining in modern statecraft. Precisely because these actions are non-kinetic and do not cause physical damage, they offer a broader range of options for states to signal to and engage in bargaining with adversaries. As a result, countries supporting Ukraine will need to address the risk of Moscow seeking to gain negotiation leverage through indirect methods in both the space and cyber domains. This will require steps to improve Ukraine’s resilience in both space and cyberspace as part of a broader deterrence strategy.

Dismantling VOA and other U.S. Media is a Strategic Mistake

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani

President Ronald Reagan believed in the power of communication. He aimed to inform a global audience about American values and find ways to provide truthful information and analysis to those who were denied access by their own government to the truth.

President Reagan selected Charles Wick, a successful businessman, to head the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and William J. Casey, his former campaign manager and successful businessman, to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Mr. Wick had an array of agencies – Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Marti (directed at Cuba) and others – which provided news and analysis in twenty-seven languages to twenty-three countries. Mr. Casey would assist, providing support, for example, to the Solidarity labor movement in Poland and methods for USIA to penetrate the Iron Curtain to reach people who had been denied access to truthful information.

During the Reagan years, information was getting into the former Soviet Union, to include Russian literature (Samizdat) banned by Moscow. When Mikhail Gorbachev was elected supreme leader in March 1985, he inherited a demoralized and financially bankrupt country. In November 1986, Mr. Gorbachev made the decision to withdraw all Soviet combat troops from Afghanistan; that deployment was costing Moscow $4-$5 billion per year, and the Soviets were suffering heavy casualties. Gorbachev also implemented a policy of openness (Glasnost) and economic and political reform (Perestroika) for the beleaguered Soviet Union. In August 1991, Gorbachev resigned and shortly thereafter Ukraine and Belarus declared independence and the Baltic States sought international recognition as sovereign states. hat was the end of the Cold War.

Larry Diamond

Shannon Tiezzi

After U.S. President Donald Trump was inaugurated in January 2025, one of his very first actions was issuing a 90-day freeze on all foreign aid. In subsequent weeks, Trump and the so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) – which, despite its name, is not an official government department – moved to more permanently dismantle the underpinnings of decades of U.S. foreign aid policy. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was effectively scuttled, with somewhere between 80 to 90 percent of its programs cut.

The Trump administration framed the cuts as necessary steps to combat waste and fraud. Analysts say otherwise, with experts pointing to the immense importance of foreign aid – both for increasing U.S. “soft power” and, more directly, helping keep the United States secure by defending against transborder threats like pandemics and terrorism fueled by poverty and state failure.

The Diplomat’s Shannon Tiezzi spoke to Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University, about the benefits of U.S. aid and why it’s become so controversial.

America’s AI Iron Curtain

Soňa Muzikárová

As we enter the second half of the 2020s, AI capabilities are increasingly becoming the key determinant of economic and military might. Hence, after years of ratcheting up US controls on exports of advanced semiconductors to China, the Biden administration, as one of its final acts in office, issued an “interim final rule” to establish a Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion. If this AI Diffusion Rule (as it is known) remains intact, the US inputs needed to develop frontier AI models will be accessible only to a tight circle of allies.

In fact, even most NATO and EU members would be sidelined from AI development – a prospect that ultimately could undermine America’s own strategic objectives. For example, Central and Eastern Europe – Europe’s industrial powerhouse – needs access to frontier AI chips to remain economically competitive and militarily secure over the next decade. Yet if America is no longer a reliable partner and supplier, the region’s economies could gravitate toward China.

Specifically, the AI Diffusion Rule creates a three-tiered hierarchy of access. The bottom tier comprises China, Russia, and the other usual suspects, which are effectively barred from the market. The most privileged tier comprises 18 trusted allies and trade partners, including the other members of the so-called Five Eyes – America’s intelligence-sharing alliance with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom – and Asian technology powerhouses such as Taiwan and South Korea.

The Price of Security: U.S. Strategy, European Dependency, and the Future of NATO

Siamak Naficy

Ever since the 1940s, the United States has served as the guarantor of Western European security through NATO. After the Cold War, debates arose about NATO’s continued relevance, and the alliance struggled to redefine its mission. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 reinvigorated NATO’s original purpose—protecting Europe and American interests against Russian aggression.

Additionally, Russia’s invasion is a stark reminder that large-scale war remains a reality. For years, there was a belief that conflicts were becoming more covert, sub-threshold, and irregular. The fact that NATO has united to support Ukraine has also led to increased interest in membership, reinforcing its core function of defense and security. With Sweden and Finland having joined, the alliance has once again expanded in direct response to Moscow’s actions, highlighting the continued relevance of collective security.

But NATO’s role has never been solely about deterring Russia. As an anthropologist, I am interested in what is particular and local but also in what is true across time and space. America’s alliances worldwide—supported by military bases and shared resources—augment its hard power and reach. To put it bluntly, however, the US’s alliances also serve to contain its adversaries and control regions. NATO, then, exists not solely as a collective defense security framework to stabilize a war-torn region, or merely as a military alliance to counter Russia (or formerly, the Soviet Union), but also as a system to ensure stabilization in ways that favor the United States.

How Russia Is Growing Its Military in the Ongoing War with Ukraine

Peter Suciu

Russia has struggled to produce its most advanced military platforms and has fewer than three dozen Sukhoi Su-57 fifth-generation fighters in service. It has also given up on mass-manufacturing the T-14 Armata main battle tank (MBT), while the production of the T-90M MBTs can barely keep up with combat losses.

Yet, what was true more than a century ago during the First World War remains true today. Russia is a massive land with a large population to draw from, a fact noted as the Kremlin announced that spring military conscription would begin on April 1, surpassing the 133,000 personnel who were conscripted last fall.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that would see as many as 160,000 individuals, citizens aged eighteen to thirty, being called up for military service. The conscription, which is slated to be even more significant than the 150,000 drafted last spring, will reportedly run from April 1 to June 15.

Such numbers are needed due to the considerable losses the Kremlin has taken in its ongoing war in Ukraine but also because many previously conscripted military personnel will be discharged as their term of service has expired.

Maneuver Warfare Is More Than Rapid Movement

Major Aric Ramsey, U.S. Marine Corps

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has prompted much criticism of the West’s embrace of maneuver warfare—a concept that requires unpacking. Russia’s strategy was to use penetrating maneuvers to take Kyiv and bring an end to the war in a matter of weeks. Its failure, critics say, is a sign that maneuver is dead, the victim of technology and shifting geopolitical landscapes.1 Defenses characterized by holding positions of advantage and efficiently inflicting great cost on an opponent are supposedly regaining their place in the methodological toolbox of war.2

Shallow interpretations of maneuver warfare—or outright misreading of it—have led to a straw-man argument: Maneuver warfare is a narrow theory of victory that will limit what retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Amos Fox calls leaders’ “ability to be true artists in warfare.”3 Maneuver warfare is much more than rapid movement to surprise an adversary and gain a positional advantage from which to reduce his ability and will to resist. It is a philosophy that first focuses on the enemy, then theorizes how best to undermine the moral commitment to his cause, and finally defeats him through the tactical application of a customized mix of methods.4 It should continue to be the guiding philosophy of Marine Corps operations.

How world order changes

Joseph S Nye Jr

After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, and almost a year before the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, US President George H W Bush proclaimed a ‘new world order’. Now, just two months into Donald Trump’s second presidency, Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s top diplomat, has declared that ‘the international order is undergoing changes of a magnitude not seen since 1945.’ But what is ‘world order’, and how is it maintained or disrupted?

In everyday language, order refers to a stable arrangement of items, functions, or relations. Thus, in domestic affairs, we speak of an ‘orderly society’ and its government. But in international affairs, there is no overarching government. With arrangements among states always subject to change, the world is, in a sense, ‘anarchic’.

Anarchy is not the same as chaos, though. Order is a matter of degree: it varies over time. In domestic affairs, a stable polity can persist despite a degree of ungoverned violence. After all, organised and unorganised violent crime remain a fact of life in most countries. But when violence reaches too high a level, it is seen as an indication of a failed state. Somalia may have a common language and ethnicity, but it has long been a site of battling clans; the ‘national’ government in Mogadishu has little authority outside the capital.

How Donald Trump Can Beat Europe’s Tech Regulations

Yaël Ossowski

President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade agenda is quickly proving unpopular with Americans, which might explain why the administration worked overtime to rebrand tariffs as “liberation” from foreign partners who treated the United States unfairly. As part of the narrative switch, Trump’s team has at least one clever weapon that could ultimately serve to defend and strengthen free trade and innovation between the US and its allies like the European Union.

By framing any punitive regulation or excessive fine issued by foreign countries against U.S. firms as a legal device that “restricts, prevents, or impedes international trade,” President Trump has made a fresh case for how digital regulation and international diplomacy should work in the twenty-first century.

This idea is more interesting and impactful than many people may realize.

As anyone who casually observes the stock market can tell you, the U.S. economy is now bound at the hip with the fate of its technology companies. At a conservative estimate of 9 percent of GDP, our nation’s powerhouse tech firms based in Silicon Valley, Austin, and New York City have become a daily presence in our lives. For better or for worse, President Trump has taken notice.

‘Inflation Day Rather Than Liberation Day’: How the World Is Reacting to Trump’s Latest Tariffs

Miranda Jeyaretnam and Chad de Guzman

Donald Trump’s promised “Liberation Day” was originally planned for Tuesday, April 1, until the President told reporters last month he pushed it back 24 hours so it wouldn’t be viewed as an April Fool’s joke. “Nobody would believe what I said,” he explained.

Perhaps he knew that his announcement on Wednesday, April 2, would sound a bit ridiculous—but everyone is certainly taking it seriously now.

Trump announced “reciprocal” tariffs on imports from nearly every nation on earth—allies and adversaries alike—in a move that is expected to rock the U.S. economy and will upend global trade.

Several world leaders have already pushed back against the latest tariffs—which were set at a minimum of 10% and rise as high as 50% for the hardest-hit countries—some promising swift countermeasures that could effectively force economies everywhere to become more insular, others asking for an opportunity to negotiate to avoid all-out trade war.

The Brewing Transatlantic Tech War

Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman

Technology companies such as Alphabet, Meta, and OpenAI need to wake up to an unpleasant reality. By getting close to U.S. President Donald Trump, they risk losing access to one of their biggest markets: Europe.

Just a decade ago, these companies believed that information technology would limit the power of governments and liberalize the world. But then, as globalization withered and the U.S. confrontation with China took hold, they tried to take advantage of growing geopolitical divides, enlisting on Washington’s side in the new technological cold war. Now, the new Trump administration appears less enthusiastic about fighting China than it is about subjugating U.S. allies in the European Union and elsewhere. U.S. tech companies extract billions of dollars in profits from European markets. Although many of these tech companies would love to take the EU regulatory state down a peg, they don’t want to get caught in the crossfire of an all-out EU-U.S. tech war.

Unfortunately for Big Tech, such a war may be about to erupt. The Trump administration’s evident contempt for Europe may not only endanger the business interests of European companies. It could also spell the end of today’s open Internet, as Europeans look to build alternative platforms to those of the giant U.S. tech firms.

The hypersonic imperative

Michael E. White

What are hypersonic capabilities?

As a general rule, hypersonic vehicles fly a significant portion of their trajectory at speeds in excess of five times the speed of sound (Mach 5, or about 3400 miles per hour at altitude). Note that many hypersonic vehicles fly at speeds well above Mach 5. The manned X-15 experimental hypersonic aircraft flew at just below Mach 7. Ballistic missiles reenter Earth’s atmosphere between Mach 10 and Mach 20, depending on their range. The space shuttles reentered from Earth orbit around Mach 25.

Urgent investment needed to address unacceptable asymmetry

There has been a recent focus on the development of long-range, hypersonic weapons that maneuver high within the atmosphere leveraging speed, a survivable altitude corridor, and lethality to change the dynamic on the battlefield. Unfortunately, potential US adversaries have seized the initiative to develop, field, and use this new class of weapons to help create an asymmetry that challenges US and allied battlefield dominance. The United States must not let that asymmetry persist.

5 April 2025

India Faces High Stakes in U.S. Trade Talks

Michael Kugelman

The highlights this week: U.S. and Indian officials conclude a first round of trade talks as U.S. President Donald Trump announces new global tariffs, India quickly dispatches humanitarian aid to Myanmar in the wake of a devastating earthquake, and comments from Bangladeshi leader Muhammad Yunus in Beijing stir controversy in New Delhi.

What “the Global South” Really Means

Zachariah Mampilly

In October 2024, at the most recent BRICS summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin urged the countries of the “global South” to build an alternative to the existing global order. Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his speech, called for “strengthening solidarity and cooperation among global South nations,” positioning BRICS—the grouping that was founded by Brazil, Russia, India, and China in 2009 but has grown considerably in the last decade—“as a vanguard for advancing global governance reform.” This was not the first time both leaders have hailed the global South.

Trump's tariffs and what they mean for Asia

Davina Tham

United States President Donald Trump called Wednesday (Apr 2) “one of the most important days, in my opinion, in American history” as he unveiled a raft of tariffs for the rest of the world.

It's part of the president's plan to address trade imbalances, and will lead to Asian economies contending with sharply higher tariffs.

What are “reciprocal" tariffs?

First, tariffs are taxes placed on foreign-made imports.

With reciprocal tariffs, the US aims to mirror import duties placed by other economies on American-made goods.

The world’s largest economy generally has lower tariffs than those it trades with.

Under Trump, the White House has criticised this lack of reciprocity.

For example, it cited a 2.7 per cent tariff on unhusked rice versus 80 per cent by India, 40 per cent by Malaysia and 31 per cent by Turkey on the same.

But it's not as simple as matching numbers.

The Evolving Landscape of Cyber and Electronic Warfare in Geopolitical Conflicts

Jeremy Makowski

As the 2020s advance, the nature of warfare is undergoing a profound transformation. Cyber and electronic warfare have emerged as indispensable elements in modern geopolitical confrontations. Nations, armed forces, paramilitary groups, and even non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, are leveraging cutting-edge technologies to secure tactical advantages without resorting to conventional combat. By targeting communications networks, critical infrastructure, and strategic systems, these adversaries are redefining the battlefield where digital operations intersect with physical conflict.

Looking ahead to 2025 and beyond, we anticipate a further expansion in the deployment of cyber and electronic warfare tools ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to signal jammers and advanced sensors complemented by increasingly sophisticated intelligence gathering methods.

The Rise of Cyber Warfare Operations

Cyber warfare has firmly established itself as a cornerstone of contemporary geopolitical strategy. The heightened reliance on digital infrastructure for communication, defense, and commerce makes these systems prime targets for disruption. Both state and non-state actors engage in cyberattacks, espionage, and sabotage to undermine critical systems and alter the dynamics of conflict. For example, Russia’s systematic use of cyber tools to compromise Ukrainian government networks, energy grids, and military operations since 2014 illustrates the potent impact of these strategies.

Exclusive: Gen. Paul Nakasone says China is now our biggest cyber threat

Dina Temple-Raston

PAUL NAKASONE: Well, I have a portfolio approach to life. Right now I'm spending about half my time with the Vanderbilt Institute of National Security. I'm also on the board of directors for OpenAI. I do public speaking and I also do some consulting work for various businesses.

CH: And do you still have a relationship with the government?

PN: I don't. I'm on a cooling-off period right now and I think after 37 years that’s good.

CH: You've said you worry that the United States is falling behind in cyberspace. … Is it the sheer prevalence of attacks that makes you say that? Is it that adversaries are stepping up with nation-state hacking groups like Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon? What are you seeing?

PN: In the year since I've left government, I would tell you that my focus is truly on The Chinese Communist Party, the People's Republic of China. They have separated themselves from other countries in terms of their capabilities.

Two years ago, we talked about [hacking groups like] Volt Typhoon and this idea of Chinese implanting malicious code in our critical infrastructure and key resources. This past year, we discovered them in our telecommunications companies.

Recently, I talked to the general manager of the Littleton Electric Water and Power District, right outside of Boston. He's a general manager there of a town of 10,000 and they just discovered the Chinese in their critical infrastructure.

Israel Enters 'Stage 3' of Cyber Wars With Iran Proxies

Nate Nelson

Reported cybersecurity incidents in Israel rose 24% in 2024, largely thanks to Iran and its proxy militias. But the trajectory of this cyber conflict has not followed a straight path, as recent signals suggest it might be slowing and evolving.

Any simple comparison of cyber threat data before and after Oct. 7, 2023, tells a seemingly straightforward story. In 2023, the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD) released 367 alerts about vulnerabilities, attacks, and threats. In 2024, that number doubled to 736, with 518 of them being "red alerts" directed to specific organizations. Calls to Israel's 119 cyberattack hotline rose 24% year-over-year, with 17,078 reports in only 365 days.

In a closed door briefing at INCD headquarters last week, government representatives reported even more significant figures. In the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks, calls and alerts to Israel's national security operations center (SoC) multiplied 10 times over — from an average of 50 per day to 500-plus. The number of known APTs targeting the country has reportedly doubled as well, though Dark Reading hasn't received specific figures to confirm this.

Despite the metrics, cyber threats to Israel haven't risen in some sort of consistent pattern over the past year and a half. Instead, INCD defense division executive director Tom Alexandrovich tells Dark Reading that the cyber war against Israel has progressed roughly in three phases. Today — during what he deems phase three — attacks aren't coming quite so hard and fast, but they have matured significantly.

For Israel, Peace in Ukraine Means Opportunity To Stop Iran | Opinion

Yaakov Katz

Over the past year, as Israel's ground offensive against Hezbollah ramped up along the Israel-Lebanon border, one disturbing pattern repeatedly emerged from the field: the overwhelming presence of Russian-made weaponry inside southern Lebanon.

Time and again, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops operating in Hezbollah-controlled territory uncovered homes converted into makeshift arsenals, packed with advanced Russian arms. Crates filled with anti-tank missiles, mortars, and rockets—many marked with Russian export codes—provided evidence of a pipeline stretching from Moscow through Damascus, and directly into Hezbollah's hands.

Among the most concerning finds were sophisticated Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, capable of penetrating even the most heavily armored Israeli vehicles. Some of these missiles were manufactured as recently as 2020, indicating a supply line that has remained active well into recent years. Alongside them were older but still lethal systems—Fagot, Konkurs, and even Soviet-era Sagger missiles. The IDF uncovered weapons stores in civilian homes, schools, and mosques, embedded in the very communities Hezbollah claims to defend.

Trump’s Tariffs Could Reshape the US Tech Industry

Lauren Goode

Sweeping tariffs unveiled by US president Donald Trump on Wednesday will have ripple effects across the tech industry, according to experts who study global trade. The measures, which include a minimum 10 percent tariff on most countries and steep new import duties on key US trading allies like Europe, China, Vietnam, India, and South Korea, sent stocks nosediving in after-hours trading.

Meta and Nvidia stock prices each fell by around 5 percent, CNBC reported, while Apple and Amazon fell around 6 percent. The iPhone maker earns roughly half its revenue by selling phones that are manufactured in China and India, while some of its other products are manufactured in Vietnam. Amazon’s online shopping marketplace is similarly heavily dependent on goods sold by third-party merchants in China.

These market dips may be just the beginning. Many economists warn that the White House has set in motion one of the largest shifts in global trade in decades, and among the results could be higher prices for US consumers and more inflation. Earlier this week, Goldman Sachs raised the probability of a US recession in the next 12 months to 35 percent, up from 20 percent.

A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System

Introduction

Americans’ opinion of how well the international trade and financial systems serve them has deteriorated substantially over the last decade. Among voters if not among economists, the consensus underpinning the international trading system has frayed, and both major parties have taken policies that aim at boosting America’s position within it. With President Trump winning reelection with a strong democratic mandate, it is reasonable to expect the Trump Administration to undertake a substantial overhaul of the international trade and financial systems. This essay surveys some tools available for doing so. In contrast to much Wall Street and academic discourse, there are powerful tools that can be used by an Administration for affecting the terms of trade, currency values, and the structure of international economic relations.

During his campaign, President Trump proposed to raise tariffs to 60% on China and 10% or higher on the rest of the world, and intertwined national security with international trade. Many argue that tariffs are highly inflationary and can cause significant economic and market volatility, but that need not be the case. Indeed, the 2018-2019 tariffs, a material increase in effective rates, passed with little discernible macroeconomic consequence. The dollar rose by almost the same amount as the effective tariff rate, nullifying much of the macroeconomic impact but resulting in significant revenue. Because Chinese consumers’ purchasing power declined with their weakening currency, China effectively paid for the tariff revenue. Having just seen a major escalation in tariff rates, that experience should inform analysis of future trade conflicts.

Reciprocity and discrimination: When are tariffs useful remedies?

Kimberly Clausing

The Trump administration has marked April 2 for its next big tariff announcement, one that it says is centered on countering unfair trade practices abroad and imposing reciprocal trade protection. The administration may invoke "reciprocity" in at least four areas: value-added taxes, corporate income taxes, digital sales taxes, and foreign trade barriers. In each case, US tariffs would not be a wise policy response.

The Trump administration has said it plans to counter each trading partner’s allegedly “nonreciprocal trading arrangements," including its tariffs, taxes, subsidies, and regulations. One possible reason for this approach is that it might provide a legal basis for the president to use congressionally delegated authorities to act against trading partners individually. The president has greater authority to levy tariffs under exceptional circumstances such as emergencies, national security, or unfair trading practices abroad. Otherwise, Congress has clear authority over the power of the purse, according to the US Constitution (Article 1, Section 8).

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